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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 82 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 19/07/1997 
Where it occurred: Kariz Mir Village, 
Shakar Dara District, 
Kabul 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Vegetation removal 
accident 
Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
hard 
residential/urban 
Date record created: 23/01/2004 Date  last modified: 23/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inappropriate vegetation cutting tool (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
vegetation clearance problem (?) 
victim squatting and stepped on mine (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
1 
inadequate equipment (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly  
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for two years. He had last attended a revision course two 
months before and last been on leave 35 days before. The ground where the accident 
occurred was described as a residential area that was "bushy" and medium hard.  
The investigators determined that the victim had checked the area with a detector then 
started to cut the grass and bush with a sickle. He stepped on a mine that he has missed at 
the end of his work on the previous day. The investigation was limited by bad security in the 
area and the investigators were unable to validate a claim that the Schiebel detector signalled 
constantly and so was unreliable.  
The Section Leader said the victim was careless because he was squatting to cut bushes 
when the accident occurred. Previously he had found a continuous reading and should have 
cleared the area from one side, then checked that the reading had gone before moving 
forward.  
The victim's partner stated that the accident occurred when the victim was squatting to cut 
bushes and stepped on a mine he had missed the day before. He suggested an alternative to 
cutting bushes by sickle would make the job safer. 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim worked too quickly at the end of the previous day 
and missed the mine, also that he had marked an area greater than that actually cleared. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that all deminers should avoid working too quickly and carry 
out proper prodding and marking procedures. They added that deminers should "ensure 
50cm safety margin" when marking the end of a cleared lane, that the command group should 
pay extra attention to deminers removing obstacles and should also make quality control 
checks in each lane daily to ensure that no detector readings are left. Finally, they 
recommended that, Section Leaders should check their men closely, especially those who 
"may be weak or careless in their duties". 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 113 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: 500,000 Rs (100%) Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
Summary of injuries: 
severe Genitals 
2 
severe Hands 
severe Leg 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
FATAL 
COMMENT 
Victim died five days after the accident. See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as: "left leg amputated and received fatal injuries on 
his thigh;" traumatic amputation of left leg under knee, serious injury to left thigh, serious 
injury to testes; injuries to both hands: died on 24th July.  
A sketch showing extensive injury is reproduced below. 
 
 
The demining group reported that the victim had suffered a below knee amputation of his left 
leg, a fracture of his left femur, lacerated wounds to his left gluteal region, left thigh, groin and 
multiple superficial injuries on both arms. The victim died five days later in Kabul hospital.  
The cause of death was given as "respiratory arrest due to septicaemia and renal failure". 
Compensation of 500,000 Rs was forwarded on 4th December 1997. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
had either been working inadequately on the previous day and his error was not corrected, or 
he was working inadequately when the accident occurred. 
The provision of a "sickle" to cut all vegetation including the tough, fibrous Afghan bush may 
be seen as a management failing because the selection of tools issued was determined by 
senior programme managers. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
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was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible. 
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